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1. Barricades in Street Fighting (As Baricadas nos Combates de Rua):

This pamphlet stresses the importance of military techniques and organization to the Communists. It points out the necessity of maintaining an offensive spirit in the use of barricades, emphasizing that they should not be used defensively, but as an offensive base. General Marshall's instructions on house-to-house combat is quoted verbatim. This is followed by Communist counter measures to such tactics.

2. The Fight Against Tanks in Street Fighting (A Luta Contra o Carro de Combate nos Combates de Rua):

This translation from the Indian Army Review points out that the tank was designed for combat in open spaces and not in cities, but adds that its usefulness in cities should not be underestimated. The weaknesses and strong points in its use and methods of combatting it are described. The final page gives top, side, and front sketches of the tank.

3. War and Guerrilla Warfare (A Guerra Regular e a Guerra de Guerrilha):

This pamphlet points out that the guerrilla is an integral part of all wars that are revolutionary in character. As the battle progresses, the guerrilla increases his forces and means of action by adapting his organization to the basic principles of the regular military units. It quotes Mao-Tse-Tung's analysis of guerrilla and regular war, and his tactics against the Chiang Kai-Shek armies. The four phases through which a guerrilla war passes are enumerated, listing each strategic objective and tactic. The differences between a war of movement or position and a guerrilla war are clearly defined.

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BARRICADES IN STREET FIGHTS

"Not only social democrat (communist) who knows at least a little history and has studied the great ~~scholar~~ military art, Engels, has ever doubted the immense significance of military knowledge, the immense importance of military technique and of military organization as an instrument which the masses of the people and the classes of the people utilize for the solution of great historic clashes." (The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government, Lenin, 1905)

This truth, which will never cease to be truth so long as society is divided into classes, has in this year of 1949 an immediate and objective meaning in the face of the imminent danger of imperialist war against the peoples of all the world in the last, desperate death rattle of moribund capitalism.

For us Brazilians the internal contradictions are still growing, which put the solution of agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution on the order of the day in pressing fashion for the overthrow of the present government — representative of the retrograde forces of the country and of national treason at the service of Yankee imperialism and the installation of a progressive, democratic, people's government.

The struggles of the wide masses for their economic and political claims, and the patriotic resistance of our people in defense of national patrimony and sovereignty against rulers who intend to transform us into a Yankee colony and cannon fodder at the service of Wall Street, these struggles, ever more vigorous and lofty, tend to result in armed clashes which in the case of declared war will be precipitated by the immediate transformation of the imperialist war into a war of national liberation.

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Nothing is more necessary, therefore, than that we communists, as the vanguard of the working class and of our people, endeavor in energetic and tenacious fashion not only to capacitate ourselves on military affairs, to which Lenin calls attention, but also to bring this knowledge to all the people in order to place us in readiness for the "historic clashes" which already appear so clearly on the horizon.

OFFENSIVE SPIRIT

Marx and Engels teach us: "The defensive is the death of all armed insurrection; in the defensive the insurrection is lost even before measuring its forces against those of the enemy."

Thus, and only thus, with a firm offensive spirit can the popular masses of the people be carried to victory. It is necessary that every day, every hour, successes be reached which continually boost the morale of the fighters and their confidence in their own strength. "Boldness, boldness, and more boldness", Danton's motto, must be the motto of the people in arms.

But in addition to fighting eagerness there is the necessity for foresighted preparation of plans, for organization of means for arming the great, aroused and eager masses for participating in the struggle.

We must always remember the working masses in Moscow in 1905, crying for arms until the last moment of the crushing of the insurrection.

Various are the aspects, and all of them important, ^{of} ~~in~~ the strictly military measures to be taken for armed, popular action; here we intend only to gather some data on a minimum part of street fights, such as the matter of barricades, and without intention of

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exhausting the subject.

BARRICADES

How do we reconcile the importance of barricades with the necessary offensive spirit? Doesn't the barricade carry with it the idea of the defensive?

Marx says, "Insurrection is an art." Therefore the means to be employed therein cannot have a static value, but depend on the manner in which they are used and in what given situation.

In reality, a barricade which is thrown up to serve as a protection for the fighters to fire from is without doubt a defensive measure, which may be proper in a given situation, but which cannot serve as a ~~barricade~~ form of fighting for our day.

In showing how the forms of armed struggle vary and accompany the development of technique, Lenin noted in 1906, with regard to barricades: "The social-democrat admitted barricade fighting in the 1840's, refuted it on the basis of concrete data ^{at} ~~in~~ the end of the 19th century, ^{and} declared himself fully willing to reexamine this last opinion and to recognize the utility of barricade fighting after the Moscow experience (1905), which gave birth, according to Kautsky, to new barricade tactics."

Why was it admitted before and refuted afterwards? Because as a trench against the arms of the regular forces of the period it was useful; but with the improvement of armament it was already becoming useless, and also because the topography of cities was being changed. Narrow and tortuous streets were being replaced by wide and straight

streets and the main ones were being transformed into wide avenues, making the barricade defenders thus vulnerable to the fire of artillery.

How then, after 1905, did the lessons of the fighting in Moscow in December of that year bring about a reexamination of the affair and the rise of a "new barricade tactic", accenting nevertheless the same factors which refuted it? What was the new fact?

The lessons of the Moscow fighting enriched insurrectional technique fundamentally through the creation of armed groups. These brought about a radical change in the use of the barricade, which passed from a defensive measure to become a base for offensive actions. It stopped being a mere trench and became an obstacle to the transit of enemy troops, providing a protected area where the insurgent forces could concentrate and move for attacks upon objectives chosen by the command. It had groups in front of it who patrolled the streets and got support from the barricade. It was the creation of these groups, acting in front of the barricades and, in case of attack, still always in front, defending them in an "active defense" with counterattacks and encirclements, which gave rise to the "new tactic" of barricades and thus justify them as a form of fighting up to the present day.

The close combination of these small groups, agile, and flexible, with the barricades not only reconciles the necessary offensive spirit with the throwing up of barricades by the masses in city fighting, but imposes their use, *in conjunction.*

Thus, except in special cases, the barricade stops being a trench and becomes an obstacle to the enemy's passage, protecting, therefore,

^{zone} an area of inside lines and permitting the groups to fight in front of it without the risk of encirclement. It guarantees liaison, the sending of reinforcements, and an easy withdrawal in case of retreat.

The defense of a barricade is, properly, no longer in its loop-^{embrasures} holes; it rests in the fighters who occupy the houses which flank it, i.e. the houses of the street in which it was ^{set} ~~thrown~~ up.

Its active defense thus conditions the location in which it must be thrown up in the proper block of the chosen street.

Almost always the immediate necessity of securing the protected area causes the barricades to be thrown up ^{from} ~~at~~ the first moment and therefore with still precarious means. This provisional barricade, so we may call it, must be situated in the middle third of the block, so that the ^{effective barricade} can be thrown up behind it at a distance which will make possible the construction of its anti-tank ditch.

The nearer it is to the front corner, with fewer houses to protect it and from which to fire on the enemy who penetrates the out-blocked corridor, the easier it is to be/flanked. And as an out-flanked barricade loses its military value, the farther it is from the front corner, the better, so as to make its encirclement more difficult.

Within a general plan, once the ^{ring of} city blocks ~~which~~ which are to surround the security areas in the individual ward or sector have been chosen, the location of the barricades and the method of throwing them up must be studied beforehand so that each one of them, ~~if~~ ^{if} ~~possible~~ will be held by the residents of the neighborhood and, if possible, of the street itself.

Without pretending to classify the measures that are to be taken

we ~~can~~ site some ^{which will be in} ~~and follow them~~ ^{later} with ~~an~~ the explanation.

- a) - the barricades must be situated, preferably, between two tall, well-built houses;
- b) - if the street isn't straight, the barricade should be situated at a point which ~~is not~~ is not under fire from weapons at the other end of the street;
- c) - the provisional barricade should be thrown up as quickly as possible; a vehicle can be used and any other material piled on that is at hand (furniture, boxes, dirt, stone, rubble or debris, etc.)
- d) - at the same time, if possible, begin throwing up the effective barricade with stronger material ^{ing} cross~~ed~~ with well supported beams (tree trunks, posts, rails) and building thick walls of bricks or paving blocks. The continual improvement of the barricade is never too much, if we take into account the fire of artillery or present-day tanks.
- e) - against tanks the most efficient defense is the ditch. This should be 6 meters long by 2 deep; it should take the whole width of the street, and the walls must be absolutely vertical. It should be made at the same time as the effective barricade, making use in the latter of the stone and dirt taken out.
- f) - houses on both sides of the street must be immediately occupied by fighters, as well as the houses on the cross street which faces a possible enemy attack. (The occupation of the cross-street houses, to the right as well as to the left, should reach on each side the last house occupied by the fighters of the barricades on the flanks.)
- g) - the ground-floor entrances to the houses occupied must be ~~blocked~~, and the fighters must ^{set up} organize their ^{firing positions in} loop-holes ~~at~~ the

upper stories and on the roof.

h) - communication and transit between the occupied houses and the rear of the barricade must be made through holes in the ^{side} walls of the upper stories, when attached, or through holes in the yard walls when separated.

i) - for entry or exit of patrols or ^{counter-attacking} fighters, ~~for a counter-attack~~, steel doors should be chosen because they ^{do not} need inside reinforcing to block them (for vehicles, steel doors should be selected which are wide enough; passage inside the security area can be assured by knocking out intervening walls).

j) - in occupied houses the following measures should be taken:

1- shut off the electricity to avoid short circuits,

2- fill all possible receptacles (bathtubs, water tanks, pots and pans) with water for putting out fires, for drinking, or for boiling as a last resort of aggression against the invaders;

k) - 3- close the windows and open only the necessary loop-holes, or else stuff them with bed clothes so as to keep the inside dark and ^{to} keep hand grenades out (if possible, the windows which aren't locked should be ^{covered} ~~screened~~ with ~~bar~~ wire screenings.)

4- the positions for shooting, throwing grenades, etc. should be chosen so as to hit from the middle of the street to the houses on the other side as well as to cover, if possible, the access to one's own house and to neighboring houses.

STREET FIGHTS

^{The use of} Barricades as an obstacle to ^(the enemy's) mounted, motorized, or mechanized ^{traffic} enemy ^{the} transit, and occupation of houses ^{to as} ~~as~~ (protect ^{ion} ~~them~~ against ~~the~~ enemy ^{soldiers} ~~on~~ foot ^{therefrom} cannot be separated from the offensive actions which are based ~~therefrom~~.

The fighters occupying the ~~security area~~ houses protecting the security area cannot remain static at their posts, awaiting a possible enemy attack; this would be subverting the whole spirit of the "new tactic of ~~the~~ barricades" and falling into the most criminal defensive. Within the plans set forth above, these fighters will have jobs of a tactical order from making reconnaissance patrols on the adjacent fronts to occupying ^{important} points permitting forces to get to ~~other~~ actions ⁶ farther beyond.

That is why it is necessary for all fighters to be organized in groups, ~~having~~ seeking to arm themselves with their own hands, because, as Lenin says: "Each and every one of those who wish ^{to} stand on the side of liberty must immediately unite in combat groups of ~~ex~~ 10, 5, and 3, freely grouped from a same profession, the same factory, or of men connected by fellowship, by party ties or simply by being neighbors (the same town, the same house in the city)!"

"Let each arm himself with what he can, one with a revolver, another with a knife, another with an oil-soaked rag to start fires, etc."

¶ "A group of fighters who do ^{not} know how to shoot or who have ~~the~~ weapons will help to throw up barricades, organize liason, prepare ambushes for the enemy, set fire to a building where the enemy has fortified himself, occupy houses ^{or} ~~the~~ floors which can serve as a base for the insurgents. In short, thousands of the most diverse tasks will be taken care of by loose groups of men resolved to kill or be killed, who have excellent knowledge of the terrain and who have the closest ties with the population."

When the masses take the defense of their interests into their own hands and, under firm, reliable leadership, throw themselves into the fight against their oppressors, they become an invincible force and are capable of successfully confronting the regular troops, no

matter what technical facilities the latter may have.

That accounts for the preoccupation of the military technicians of imperialism in instructing their troops with rules which can meet the ~~popular~~ ^{popular} fights which will take place when they intend to carry into effect the desperate adventure of dominating the peoples of the entire world.

In one of the instruction circulars of the American Army, ^{number} 41, we find: "All civilians must be examined with the greatest care because of the possibility of their being enemy agents or guerrillas."

Then come the complaints showing how difficult it is for regular troops to use their means against fighters in a city; these issues must be ^{made} known ^{to} the people. Here they are: "Streets and avenues invite movement but constitute corridors readily swept by fire." "Observation and firing fields are limited." "Operations of mechanized vehicles are ordinarily very restricted and channelized since they are subjected to short range fire by various ^{weapons} ~~arms~~. Tanks under such conditions have an even greater disadvantage because of the difficulty of using their guns against the upper parts and the basements of buildings." "The close proximity between opposing forces will limit the efficacy of immediate air and artillery support." "Communications will be precarious, making it imperative to decentralize the command down to the smallest units." The reason for this last complaint is the danger that in decentralization the soldiers might fraternize with the people's forces.//

Decentralization therefore makes the fight for the conquest of the soldiers much easier for the insurgent forces, which before and during the fight is one of the fundamental tasks of the whole insurrection.

Lenin in/ showing us the lessons to be drawn from the fighting in Moscow in 1905 tells us: "The Moscow ^{insurrection} ~~fighting~~ shows us precisely the most desperate and furious fighting between the reaction and revolution by the Army." "In reality the vacillation of the troops, inevitable in the presence of any truly popular movement, leads, when the revolutionary struggle becomes more acute, to a veritable struggle for the Army."

~~In~~ The "War Department" regulation, signed by Marshall and imposed by Dutra ~~as~~ a manual of instruction ^{for} ~~to~~ our Army, confesses that "great quantities of hand grenades will be necessary for ~~hand~~ house-to-house fighting" and that it is necessary to "remove obstructions to the lines of communications, including the removal of existing barricades,"

In spite of their being instructions for throwing our soldiers against our people, we can and we must draw ^{will} lessons which ~~serve~~ for crushing their own Nazi-Yankee ~~authors~~ and their national ~~and~~ agents, traitors to the Country.

Here are some instructions of Marshall which we can use against him and his ilk : "In house-to-house fighting hand grenades are essential and rubber shoes or cord soles must be used" or else "stockings worn over shoes or cloth wrapped around them." "For scaling a wall, the use of a rope with a loop at one end and a short piece of wood at the other is of inestimable value. Various climbing ropes of this kind can be tied together for scaling the highest walls. Tying an iron hook ~~to~~ to one end ^{of the rope} ~~the rope~~ one can easily scale walls, passing from one ~~xx~~ building to another or even reaching a relatively high window."

"Locations which allow cover must be chosen in advance. It is too late to look for shelter under fire. In combat more ~~concealed~~

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casualties result from grouping together than from any other cause. This is especially true of house-to-house fighting. "When approaching corners, do so with ^{care} ~~precision~~. Stick close to walls and ^{to} the sides of buildings. Dash from cover to cover. Get quickly over rooftops and walls. Do ^{not} ~~not~~ expose your head and shoulders. Try to create diversions so as temporarily to distract the enemy's attention and take advantage of that momentary situation." "When we are working at ^{close range} ~~short distance~~, a few men, well instructed and commanded, can accomplish more than a larger number used unnecessarily."

"When there is reason to believe that an armed enemy occupies a room, it is suicide to ~~hurry~~ to enter it without first having killed him or put him out of action. It is much safer to make a small hole in the wall through which a hand grenade can be thrown ~~inside~~. Then immediately rid the room of its occupants. When making a hole in a wall, be careful to protect yourself from enemy fire through the opening. Keep the hole covered so that the enemy can't beat you to it by throwing through the opening." "The enemy who defends a room can throw up a barricade in a corner to protect himself from grenades. Do not suppose that the explosion of a grenade in a room has killed all the enemy. Keep a close eye on the barricade and have a grenade ready to throw on it."

"The enemy will habitually ^{try} ~~seek~~ to hold ^{on to} ~~strongly~~ the ~~third~~ ground floor of a house, retreating to the upper part when an entry is forced at ground level. Whenever possible, attack a building ^{from} by the upper part -- action is easier from top to bottom. Movement through ^{breaks} the roofs or through ruptures in the walls of ~~the~~ upper stories will greatly facilitate this mode of attack." "Before throwing grenades at windows or doors, be sure that they are not protected with wire screen."

"Frequently doors are locked, blocked, or barred with barricades placed by the enemy. In such cases it is easier to force an entry through a window or a hole opened in the wall." Inspect the house from cellar to attic. It is fatal to leave a house occupied by the enemy to one's rear. During the inspection look for openings made in the walls by the enemy, in order to be able to get out of the building quickly. Frequently such openings are concealed behind furniture, under stairs, and in attics or cellars."

"Use simple means to identify buildings occupied ^{by} the enemy and those which have been cleaned out by friendly forces. The use of chalk marks is very efficient."

"The built-up area to be defended must be situated in such relation to the whole defensive set-up that the enemy will be forced into a direct attack or a delayed maneuver. A position which can be easily avoided has little defensive value." "The machineguns for immediate defense are installed at ground-level height so as to obtain fire command over the enemy's probable streets and avenues of approach."

These instructions, it is clear, are directed against people's forces and will serve under the angle which interests us. Thus it is interesting to learn of the "efficient means" of chalk-marking houses already cleaned out ^{in order} ~~is interesting to know~~ to cause confusion among the enemy ^{by} marking in the same way ^{our} positions ~~which interests us~~. It isn't by chance that one ~~doesn't~~ finds ^{no} anti-tank measures in the instructions, measures which are indispensable for people's fighters. Besides the ditches already mentioned for blocking the passage of any vehicle, the means for destroying tanks which are most within the people's reach are:

1)- five or six hand grenades tied together and thrown under a tank immobilize it by destroying its tread. A cord extended at ground level between two front houses, with the grenades tied in the middle, can be pulled by the ends so as to make the tank crush them when passing. They must be camouflaged in the best possible manner so that the tank driver will not see them.

2)- easily made incendiary bottles (just fill with gasoline and throw with a lighted fuse) will, because of their suffocating heat, force the occupants to crawl out through the ~~door~~^{turret}, making them vulnerable to any weapon.

One of the easiest means of immobilizing vehicles with inner tubes is to throw tire barbs in their path. These barbs are no more than three little ~~pointed~~^{caltrops} steel ~~pieces~~^{caltrops} soldered together at their ends so that one of them will always ~~point~~^{stick} up.

An effective measure is to ~~use~~
Against jeeps and motorcycles ~~and other vehicles~~
extending steel cables of strong ropes at a height of a meter and a half. Against cavalry the height should be about ~~about~~^{corks} 70 centimeters. Bottle-stoppers or small pieces of broomstick can also be used with success to make horses fall.

The means for aggression and ambush are countless before the creative initiative of the masses and will multiply as the fighting goes on. Nevertheless, the grenades, main weapon of the people in street fighting, ~~must~~ can and must be made beforehand by all who have a minimum of the necessary means and understand the full importance of that weapon in the hands of the people.

With regard to the ~~importance~~^(of grenades) ~~Lenin~~^{said} ~~was already saying~~ in 1906: "the bomb stopped being the weapon of the individual 'dynamite terrorist' and became the necessary element to the armament of the people."

"The force doesn't exist which can face detachments of the Revolutionary Army which are equipped with bombs and which have behind them -- and this last condition is the most important -- hundreds of thousands of workers."

Any piece of pipe, and even small cans, filled with explosive (such as quarry dynamite) and having a detonator and a fuse, ^{can be used as} ~~there is~~ a bomb or grenade. Making it simpler, more efficient, etc., must be a constant ^{concern} preoccupation, but for the creative spirit of the people there are no obstacles of that sort, and as Lenin says: "It is possible to prepare bombs anywhere." "Armed insurrection is a special aspect of the political struggle."

The study and knowledge of military technique, and particularly ^{techniques} those connected with the people's revolutionary struggles, in which the masses fight with precarious means of aggression against the forces of reaction ^(which are) many, many times better equipped and organized, can in no manner be disconnected ~~from~~ in their application from the fundamental political factor, to which all the forms of struggle are conditioned.

It is never too much for a revolutionary to take into account ^{deviation?} the danger of a possible deformation caused by insurrectional technical-military studies. This deformation is characterized by seeing revolutionary movements as a technical problem without understanding the decisive significance of the political moment ^{the} and that that "fundamental political moment" is represented by the objective and subjective conditions existing in a given situation.

The historic experience is characterized in the French revolutionary, Auguste Blanqui, one of the heroes of the Commune of Paris. ^{This} That little bourgeois ^{error} mistake with the name of "Blanquism"

supposed that by means of conspiracies on the part of a handful of revolutionaries, without contact with the masses and without their support, ~~could~~ ^{it would be possible to} change the social regime.

There is nothing better than the words of Stalin to put us on ^{right} track [st:bed] in the real Marxist groove: "I believe that the Bolsheviks are Antæus ^{Antæus} like ~~Antæus~~, hero of Greek mythology. Just like Antæus—they are strong because they maintain contact with their mother, the masses, who gave birth to them, raised ~~them~~ and educated them. And so long as they maintain contact with their mother, the people, they can count on being invincible. This is the key to why the Bolshevik leadership is invincible." (On Deficiencies in Party Work.)

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ANTI-TANK FIGHTING IN STREET COMBATS

(~~Translation~~ Translation from the Indian Army Review)

For a better understanding of the subject, it is necessary to think of the tank realistically, so that we will not be led to overestimate or underestimate its value as a war machine in street combats, whether in smaller places or in large centers.

The tank in its modern form appeared in the war of 1914-18 as a device ^{widely} ~~largely~~ used on the battlefield, i.e. outside ^{settled} ~~populated~~ places. The ^{rate with which} ~~reason for using~~ the tank ^{is used} in this situation (cross-country) shows us that the tank was built for this purpose and that its use inside cities and towns is considered as a special combat situation requiring a very complex technique never before encountered in our military ^{circles} ~~circles~~, even ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ simple conversation.

To ~~as an illustration~~ of how ^{the tank is} ~~the tank is~~ ^{suited} ~~suited~~ for fighting in towns and cities, we quote some excerpts from military articles and regulations. ~~the tank is suited for fighting in towns and cities, we quote some excerpts from military articles and regulations.~~

The "Field Manual for the Armored Forces" (C17-100), which lays down the "standards for guiding the instruction and tactical use of Armored Divisions," has the following to say in its paragraph 83, dealing with "Fighting in Populated Places":

"a. Whenever possible, armored units will avoid populated places. Even though tanks can crush houses of light construction, they cannot raze blocks of solidly built houses, besides which there is always the risk of falling

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into cellars. Consequently tanks go down the center of streets, where they can be stopped by barricades, hidden ^{guns} anti-tank ~~weapons~~, mines, and grenades thrown from roof-tops, second-story windows, or basements."

The 94-page "Tank Company Manual" (FM 17-32) has only the following to say about attacks on populated places:

"34. ATTACKING POPULATED PLACES - Whenever possible, populated places are to be avoided. When a populated place has to be won, it is to be attacked frontally with infantry, engineers, mortars, and assault ~~guns~~ cannon, using tanks for encirclement."

Training Circular No. 41 (TC-41), which deals ^{safely} ~~only~~ and exclusively with "Combat in Populated Places," says the following:

"(4) Operations of mechanized vehicles are ordinarily very restricted and channelized, since they are subject to short-range fire by various weapons. Under such conditions tanks carry an even greater disadvantage because of the difficulty of using their guns against the basements and upper parts of buildings."

Further on, under no.9, the manual says:

"Single tanks may be used as close-support cannon for firing on strongly fortified buildings, and when so used, they must have the immediate support of the infantry."

To complete the examples we have given, we cite one ^{from} ~~which is~~ ~~already the fruit of experience~~ of the last war, by Col. Gen. [two letters illegible] huikov of the glorious Red Army of the USSR, condensed and reproduced in the "Military Review."

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"During assault the tanks are displaced behind the infantry, supporting it with fire, whether stopped or in motion. They shoot against windows, barricades, and all nests of enemy resistance. Since the streets are laced with cannon and machinegun fire, the tanks must proceed through openings made in the walls and courtyards of houses. It is up to the engineers to open these paths..."

We consider these articles and quotations ^{from} ~~of~~ regulations more than sufficient to show how precarious the tank is as an instrument of war for fighting in built-up areas. Before going any further, we wish to make a few observations so that the ^{combat} capacity of the tank may not be underestimated. What has been said here pertains to combats in which the armored forces come up against the regular forces and not against the people. We must ~~know~~ ^{enable ourselves to exploit} the deficiencies of armored units as pointed out here, since they are ~~non~~ [#] less real when it is the insurgent people who are to fight against tanks and other armored vehicles. For this purpose it is necessary to be acquainted with the advantages and ^{weak points} ~~disadvantages~~ of the tank as an instrument of war.

1) - The tank is a strongly armored war machine which can withstand the impact of a shell from a gun of greater calibre than its own. This means that if it carries a 37-mm. cannon, only a higher calibre cannon can pierce its armor.

2) - Its turret (where a cannon and a machinegun are mounted together) has a swing of 360 degrees, i.e. a complete circle, which can be turned to any side.

3) - It has a machinegun mounted on the lower right front

for shooting ~~the~~ point-blank, since the man who ^{fires} ~~operates~~ it cannot take aim.

4) - It has an antiaircraft machinegun mounted on the tank commander's hatch (top opening on right side of turret) which can shoot in all directions, including up.

5) - The driver has no armament and is located in the lower left side.

6) - The crew, as the men who work inside the tank are called, is made up of 4 or 5 men who have sidearms for combat on foot outside the tank, such as submachine guns, grenades, and rifles.

7) - The tank communicates with other tanks by means of ^{radio transmitter-receiver,} ~~a sender-receiver radio.~~ The antenna is easily distinguishable, since it is on the outside of the turret and is made up of a series of metal tubes screwed together and painted black. Communication inside is by means of a kind of telephone.

8) - The tank's visibility system is all or almost all indirect, by means of telescopes, one for each member of the crew.

9) - The tank's engine is mounted in the rear of the tank. In most tanks of our Armed Forces this is a gasoline engine, quite susceptible to spontaneous fires not easy to put out. The door to the engine is behind the tank.

10) - ^{The tank} ~~It~~ rolls on caterpillar treads, powered by the front sprocket wheels.

11) - Underneath, what is commonly called the Belly of the

tank is completely armored, with no hole or opening.

From this short description of the characteristics of the tank it is easy to understand that it is a powerful war machine with such good qualities as:

- 1) great firepower
- 2) excellent armor
- 3) great cross-country mobility
- 4) great impact ~~power~~.

But it is also necessary not to forget, which for our case is most important, that it has many defects, such as:

- 1) very little visibility
- 2) small quantity of ammunition
- 3) outside liaison (with other tanks) almost exclusively by radio
- 4) great engine and tread noise which give it away and reduce its occupants' observation capacity
- 5) little mobility within cities, since it must stick to streets
- 6) driver can only see forward
- 7) very susceptible to fires.

Besides these deficiencies, we need to consider that its crew is composed of 4 or 5 men, men who complement each other, since the individual tasks that each one carries out are part of a whole -- teamwork, properly called. The work is so much tied together that it is normally compared with the five fingers of our hand. If the finger which characterizes the hand is the thumb, in the tank crew the man who corresponds is the tank

commander, who goes in the upper right opening of the turret. But since the tank's visibility is limited, the tank commander normally keeps his ^{head} outside the turret, leaving his hatch open to see better.

The conclusions which may be drawn from this small study in the combat of the people against tanks are the following:

1) - It is quite impossible to wish to take action directly against the tanks' armor, since it isn't likely that the people will have antitank guns in the beginning of the fighting.

2) - Since the tank's turret can swing ⁱⁿ a complete circle to any side, and since it has a cannon and two machine guns (one antiaircraft), it is necessary to approach the tank from the rear of the turret, i.e. from the side opposite the muzzles of the cannon and the machinegun beside the cannon (see fig. 1).

3) - If the tank has a machinegun ⁱⁿ mounted in front, it is clear that it must only be approached from the rear. (fig. 1).

4) - If the tank has an antiaircraft machinegun and the tank commander has to be outside to handle it, make him get back in so as not to be able to use the weapon (fig.1).

5) - The driver cannot be hit directly because of the good armor which protects him, but his visibility is by means of a periscope. The solution is to break the periscope, which is of glass and plastic, leaving him unable to see to drive but still able to drive with instructions from the tank commander or any other member of the crew. It is necessary to try to break everything which might be glass, because no one will then be able to see any longer, and the tank will lose its fundamental character-

ability to maneuver
istic, which is its displacement capacity.

3.
4.

These conclusions lead us to point out the most efficient and recommendable methods for putting tanks out of action.

A) Since the visibility of the tank is very limited, the tank commander prefers to keep his head above his open hatch to see better. This makes him a good target. If we cannot hit him, we ~~must~~ make him get inside, whereupon he will use the periscope. The solution is the destruction of all periscopes, which will leave the tank completely blind. This may be done with rifle or shotgun fire or even with stones.

B) The small supply of ammunition which tanks carry is a deficiency which will be exploited automatically as long as the tanks have to fight.

C) If outside liaison (with other tanks) is by radio, and since there is no transmission without an antenna, try to put the tank's antenna out of order, which can be done with a strong blow against the antenna itself or by cutting the ^{cords} ~~wires~~ which tie it down, because the antenna sticking up will strike trolley wires, burning out the radio and making even inside communication impossible, which will greatly diminish the tank's efficiency.

D) The noise which the tank makes will not let its crew know everything that is going on outside, even with other tanks. Take advantage of this to make your shots with calmness, precision, and security.

E) If the mobility of tanks in cities is small, it is necessary to make it even smaller, since the less mobility a tank has, the easier it is to attack it and destroy it. Throw up

barricades on corners, narrow streets, viaducts, and tunnels, and make them active, that is, defend them with rifle fire, grenades and bombs, and, as a last resort, set fire to them, which will take away the tank's ^(will) "desire" to get by them.

F) The driver is the one who makes the tank go; break his periscope (see fig.1) and immobilize the tank, which will at least hurt the crew's morale and might even cause panic.

G) The tank is very susceptible to fires. Take advantage of that construction defect by provoking fire. This can be done with a "Molotov cocktail", which is easily prepared. The places to throw to produce effect are shown in figure no.2.

Besides these means for the people to fight tanks there are many other efficient ones, which we enumerate:

One of the easiest things to do is to derail a caterpillar tread, which makes the tank lose its steering and requires a lot of work to regain. All that is necessary is to throw logs ^{10 15 cms.} 4 to 6 inches in diameter into the treads, or iron tubes of the same size, strong enough not to be broken or chewed up. This should be done ^{preferably} on curves, on the inside tread, as shown in figure no.3. This can also be done with ^a large quantity of cloth or clothing and in the same situation shown in figure no. 3.

Another operation which can be carried out with success is pouring oil on the ground at curves, which will make ~~the~~ tanks lose ~~the~~ ^{their} steering control through skidding and accidents which can cause serious damage. It is necessary to remember that the quantity of oil must be great (around 200 liters) to achieve the desired effect. Finally, the oil can be mixed with gasoline and

ignited, which should be done after the passage of some tanks in a column, for example the first three, in order to separate them from the rest and take them as the weakest enemy, which is more favorable.

The burning of any smoke-producing substance at the points where the columns must change direction may bring about the dispersion of the column, which is a great loss in materiel and morale.

We call particular attention to the following facts, which are very important to that part of the people which might be called upon to fight tanks.

- 1) Attack the last tanks of a column first, ^{if} ~~since~~ it hasn't been possible to ~~maintain~~ hold up the column .
- 2) Never stay near a burning tank, since its ammunition and gasoline will explode.
- 3) Try to approach tanks from the sides or rear.
- 4) Make the crew get out of the tank in order to fight them.
Remember that nobody attacks the wolf in his own den.
- 5) Always move by surprise when possible.
- 6) Get in the highest possible points for attacking tanks, such as roofs, houses [✓] over two stories, church towers, and the like.
- 7) Be persistent and persevering in order not to reveal your methods before the opportune moment.
- 8) Do not forget that "against the people organized, neither tanks nor cannon avail."

LEGEND

1. Commander's opening
2. Turret machinegun
3. Cannon
4. Front machinegun
5. Antenna
6. Antiaircraft machinegun
7. Periscopes
8. Antenna tie-cords
9. Openings
10. Wheels

FIGURE No. 1

Top view of tank

Front view of tank

FIGURE No. 2

Side view of tank. Throw in directions indicated by arrows

A, B, and C.

FIGURE No. 3.


"CURVA" equals CURVE

Throw in direction indicated by arrow D, between front
support wheels (no. 10 of figure 2).

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REGULAR WARFARE
AND
GUERRILLA WARFARE

Differences

Points of contact

Connections

"The guerrilla war is an integral part of all wars
which have a revolutionary character."

B. M. P. - 4

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REGULAR WAR AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

(Differences, points of contact, connections)

The prospect of installing a people's revolutionary government in our country is intimately connected, whatever might ~~be the~~ develop in the international situation (peace or war), with the prospect of creating a people's revolutionary army. The basis of a people's army is fundamentally the people armed, and it can be said that the new army of the people is already being formed among us in the struggles of the Brazilian working masses against hunger, exploitation, and police violence, in the cities and in the fields, and in the resistance of the majority of the nation to the colonization of Brazil and the imminent threat of a new imperialist war. But on the other hand, in a country such as ours in which the armed forces have strong traditions of fraternization and even of active participation in popular movements for Independence, for the Republic, and against imperialism, it is necessary to consider the priceless contribution which the nation expects and must receive from its armed forces -- whether through its cadres and the support of the great masses of soldiers and sailors in the struggles of the working masses, or through the adherence of entire units of men and materiel to the patriotic struggle. Going no further, the examples of Guararapes, the war of the Cabanos, and others, as well as the recent example of the Prestes Column, show well how ~~they~~ capable are the military formations in which participate patriots in uniform and out, united by a common objective. But it is ~~the~~ international experience which today furnishes the most current and most complete lessons in this regard, foremost being the recent examples which come to us from Asia and Europe in the great war of the

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peoples against the Nazi or Japanese invaders in 1931, 1936, or 1939 until the end of the Second World War.

In 1922 in Soviet Russia, after the war against foreign intervention was over, the recently created Red Army condensed in its military doctrine the experiences of the Great War of 1914-1918 and of the civil war ~~which~~ ^{ruling} against the old ~~dominant~~ classes allied with the foreign interventionists. It was the first concrete example of military doctrine of a modern ^{people's} army, ~~of the people~~. In the same manner, the new people's armies born in the fighting of the Resistance against the troops of the Axis in 1940 to 1945 are supported in a military science covering [everything] from ~~guerrilla~~ the art of ^{popular} guerrilla warfare, essentially the ~~people's~~ ^{people's} ~~kind~~ to the most advanced concepts of military art of modern regular armies. And the same may be said of the new democratic armies which since 1945 are being forged and developed in the patriotic war against imperialist intervention, whether American (in Greece), English (in Burma), Dutch (in Indonesia), or French (in Viet-Nam).

That is to say that far from being mutually exclusive, guerrilla warfare and regular warfare combine, mesh, and complete each other. It is evident that "in the beginning of a real people's war everything, or nearly everything, must be based on guerrilla warfare," which represents the fundamental form of warfare at that time. But as the fighting develops and the forces and means of fighting are enlarged, the guerrilla war grows up in the sense of adapting its organization, its principles, and its war tasks to the organization and principles of the regular units. The regular army in its turn, once it has been formed on new bases, firmly supports its tactics, strategy, and very organization in a more and more intimate liaison with the people and with new guerrilla forces, combining

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the action of the regular units with the multifarm action of the guerrillas and with the mass actions of the population, both on the battle fronts as well as in the rear of the enemy's armies.

In an extremely useful study on the role of "guerrilla warfare in anti-imperialist total war" in China, Mao Tze-tung analyzes this interrelationship between guerrilla warfare and regular war, as well as the origins, characteristics and conditions of victory and defeat in people's wars. The passages and observations which follow were made by him and by other fighting chiefs of both the war in China and of the recent patriotic wars in Europe and Asia and, even today, in Greece and Spain.

What is guerrilla warfare?

"Guerrilla warfare is an integral part of all wars which have a revolutionary character." It "cannot be looked upon as an independent form of making war but as a form and a stage of war and basically as a form and a stage of revolutionary wars." Thus "the guerrilla war does not possess an absolutely independent character, inasmuch as it constitutes only a phase of war." To carry out ^{war's} the objective, it must gradually develop and get its main forces to turn into regular armies, to unleash a coordinated war with other guerrilla forces scattered throughout the country and with regular armies already existing or recently organized. "Thus guerrilla warfare obeys objective laws of development."

If, as Clausewitz teaches, "war is the continuation of a policy", the guerrilla war represents in China "the continuation of the policy of a semi-colonial people in their fight against imperialism."

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It must therefore have a clearly defined political objective and must resolutely undertake immediate political tasks or a single national front political program against imperialism.

That means: awaken, organize, and consolidate politically the great masses of the people; unite politically the internal forces, disintegrate politically the enemy, destroy his political power; establish an anti-imperialist political power, recover territories occupied by the enemy, create anti-imperialist bases in the enemy's rear, cooperate with all anti-imperialist armed forces, and fight for the definitive conquest of the final political objective -- national emancipation.

Those who think that "guerrilla warfare is not a political problem but a purely military problem," adopt a viewpoint which would deprive guerrilla warfare of its political objective and which "would lead inevitably to the abandonment of the political work, the disappearance of popular support, and the eventual downfall of the guerrilla war."

Now the essential condition for the victory of a people's war is its ^{close connection} intimate liaison with the people:

"If the political objective of the guerrilla war does not coincide with that of the people, if it does not involve ~~the~~ support, ~~the~~ participation, ~~the~~ help, or coordinated action on the part of the people, it will also fail. That is why guerrilla warfare can only be a form of revolutionary war and cannot be adopted by any kind of counter-revolutionary war. That stems from the fact that guerrilla war is fundamentally organized and

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assured by the masses and that there is no possibility for its persisting and developing once it is isolated from the people or is incapable of attracting the cooperation and participation of the large masses." It is indispensable, therefore, to take into account "the guerrilla war's own mass nature." It is "the armed ~~force~~ strength of the masses engaged in their anti-imperialist political task and is not to be separated from the masses for even a minute."

How are guerrilla wars born?

In Europe and in certain countries in Asia, the guerrilla units were born directly of the people and, fundamentally, of the struggles of the masses against hunger, food requisitioning, pillage; of the resistance to terror, to mobilization for military service and for forced labor, required by the war machines of the enemy. Such was the typical example in France. In other countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, and entire regions of the Soviet Union, the guerrilla war was furthered by the cooperation of large and small units of the national army, ^{which,} beaten and cut off from their bases by the invading armies, retreated to the marshes or the mountains and continued the war, supported by national resistance. Czechoslovakia may be included in that case, and, in part, Italy, where fractions of the army rebelled later against the occupiers and joined the national guerrilla formations.

Mao Tze-tung indicates that in China the creation of guerrilla forces presents many different forms, to wit:

- guerrilla forces created directly by the masses of the people (this is the basic form, and Chinese youth, particularly the

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young students played a role of primary importance in it);

- forces derived from the local militia;
- forces grown out of mutinied enemy troops;
- forces made up of groups of bandits.

There are still other forms, in which the close coordination between the action of a regular army, operating from a given base, and that of guerrillas, scattered throughout the ~~xx~~ territory, is clearly apparent. Their aim is to coordinate the guerrilla war with the war of movement, to develop the guerrilla war during a period in which it is not well understood, or to head the guerrilla war ~~in~~ in a secure direction in a given region. Such is the case, for example, with the

- detachments (provisional or permanent) sent to a region by a regular army

or with the

- mixed forces, made up of a military detachment and civilian groups.

The study of the different phases through which people's war can pass gives a better understanding of the variety of origins of guerrilla units. A leaflet edited by the National Resistance Council in France during the Occupation ("Insurrection is an art") defines as follows the four strategic and tactical phases through which people's war can pass, i.e. the transformation from an unarmed into an armed nation:

1st phase: small-scale guerrilla war (small detachments of guerrillas and civilian snipers [francs-tireurs]).

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Strategic objective: destroy the enemy's feeling of security.

Tactics: ambush, surprise attacks; killing isolated officers and soldiers, taking their weapons. In addition: sabotage of all kinds -- in factories, power plants; destruction of high tension lines, of the enemy's transportation facilities, etc.

2nd phase - organized guerrilla warfare:

Strategic objective: preventing the enemy from being master of the country he is occupying (the first bases and liberated areas appear [at this phase]). This is attained by making the enemy disperse his forces to meet the danger of insurrection which is in preparation.

In this second phase the strategic objective requires the ~~concentrated~~ ~~massive~~ attack on the enemy's communications.

It must be taken into account that the more modern and motorized an army is -- the more it depends on industry and transportation -- the more vulnerable it is to the blows of guerrillas and francs-tireurs. The main effort is directed against rail lines, dams, transformers, etc. To disperse the enemy's forces, it is necessary to attack his manpower -- patrols, small garrisons, detachments on the march; these lightning attacks and the conquest of arms demand the formation of disciplined detachments. "The combined action of various detachments converging from different points upon the enemy and withdrawing by different routes, once the planned operation has been carried out, permits the finest combinations of military art, the application on a small scale of the rules of strategy of a big war." (Kamienki).

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3rd phase - formation of the first large nuclei of the insurgent army:

Tactics: continuation of the foregoing, by now including field battles. Necessary conditions: sufficient training of the francs-tireurs and guerrillas and widened combat participation on the part of the local populace, for it is necessary at any price to ^{bring} ~~drag~~ the local populace into the struggle. With the first victories, the possibility may be considered of having stable bases, always on condition of being able to scatter forces again in case of a temporary military defeat. Then adopt extended order and enlarge your forces "submerging in the people" (in the case of liberated areas and of large cities in the hands of patriots, serving them as bases). The political condition is in having a program of action felt by the people, in supporting their claims, defending their interests, being their army. Punish and banish looting and provocation. Constant vigilance against enemy penetration, espionage, etc.

4th phase - national insurrection:

Objective: liberation of national territory.

Mass rising. Formation of the "regular" national army, officered by the war-hardened francs-tireurs and guerrillas. Regular strategy in war against the enemy, even though keeping guerrilla activity, which, as Kamieniski says, "must follow its own methods until the end of the war and thus support the army."

the basic prerequisites
 "To arrive at national insurrection, ~~it is necessary to assure its~~

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are
 fundamental: (1st) - the development of military organizations
 in the fighting; (2nd) - the patriotic unity of the nation.
 This means a patriotic struggle by all the people, taking into
 consideration not only sabotage and armed action but mass action of
 all kinds, particularly ^{sit-down} strikes ~~wherever~~ works and insurrectional
 strikes."

The same ^{way} ~~road~~ is ^{pointed out} ~~indicated~~ by the chiefs of the Resistance in
 Italy. In the leaflet "Mobilizing and organizing the people for
 insurrection" (Milan, 1945) it is pointed out that

"national insurrection must be the task of not just a vanguard
 but of all the people. To arrive at general insurrection it
 is necessary to combine the blows of small groups, the military
 actions of greater scope, and the actions of the masses."

That these tactics and strategy are superior to those of the
 invaders are demonstrated by events themselves. It is clear that
 the strategic objective varies with the conditions of the country
 and with the development of the fighting ~~itself~~. In Western as in
 Eastern Europe the strategy of the patriots aims at undermining
 the feeling of security among the adversary, destroying his war
 machinery, withdrawing and diverting from the battle fronts the
 greatest number of enemy divisions, defending national property,
 preparing general insurrection and thus pressing the allied offensive,
 collaborating with the regular forces once they are thrown into battle;
 in the Soviet Union, in Yugoslavia, in Greece it is an integral part
 of the offensives of the national army, preventing or hindering the
 withdrawal of the enemy's forces, hastening the liberation of cities
 and regions, retarding the adversary's reinforcements or the arrival

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of his materiel in the theaters of operations. Thus it is seen that guerrilla strategy, even when it concerns forces which represent only the first nuclei of a people's army, has no isolated aspect; it is geared in with the strategy of the United Nations. The fighting of the allied armies, especially on the Eastern front aims at the extermination of the adversary. But "final victory can only be assured when the enemy troops ^{are} beaten ^{and} can no longer count on an economically solid rear area with a solid morale."

"Final and decisive success can only be assured (the Soviet field-service regulations teach) with the destruction of military power in its entirety. Thus the plan of conduct of the war must not just provide for the destruction of the bulk of the enemy's forces in a single decisive battle, but must likewise be based on a study of the different forms which the ^{fighting} ~~battle~~ can take for the total annihilation of the adversary's military power."

^{Along with} ~~Basic~~ long-range strategic air power, the action of air-borne ^{fighting} ~~XXXX~~ troops, and other means, these "different forms which the ~~XXXX~~ can take" have their real expression in the people's armies which are ^{occupied} forged within each country. The essential condition for this is action, since "combat is the best means for achieving the strategic operation." Thus the patriots' strategy in their people's war aims at the sabotage and destruction of the invader's ^{his} war machine, the disorganization of ^{his} ~~their~~ transportation, the insecurity and annihilation of ^{his} ~~their~~ troops, ^{his} ~~their~~ expulsion from the country. In combination with ~~the~~ armed struggle go sabotage against the delivery of provisions and raw materials, resistance to requisitionings, refusal to partici-

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pate in the war in the enemy's service, to work for him, to accept his presence and the dictation of his ^{domestic} home-grown agents. Therein lies the ~~xxxxx~~ inexhaustible source of the reserves of the armies of the people: the youth who stay out of military service and do not work for the enemy; the working class which refuses to produce for the oppressors of the nation; the peasants who hide and defend their products and their property; the military patriots in ever greater number who understand the right of the national cause and place themselves at its service. Mao Tse-tung teaches that

"even in countries where there is great weakness in the organization of the people, the brutality of the invader facilitates the unified resistance effort. The war becomes a struggle for all the people."

A special importance is taken on by the political job of disintegrating and demoralizing the adversary's armed forces, which are characterized "by an extreme moral and political heterogeneity that exerts an increasingly ~~accentuated~~ influence on their military qualities;" as may be seen, the patriotic objectives of the people's war make an extremely important contribution to the general strategy of the war, a contribution characterized by

the political decomposition of the troops,
the destruction of materiel and firepower,
the exhaustion or the immobilization of the reserves,
the reduction of the adversary's territorial base.

As for the tactics of the guerrillas, "they are superior to those of the enemy, because they are based on close contact with the population, on knowledge of the country, of the spirit, the move-

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ments, the numbers, and even the immediate plans of the adversary. They are based on the mobility of the detachments; on knowledge of the local topography; on sudden and unexpected attack; on speed of concentration and on extended order; on mutual support of the units; on a boundless, heroic tenacity in battle; and finally, on an intelligence service supported by the masses, using thousands of eyes and ears, aiding in the stamping-out of treachery and of espionage for the enemy."

The principles with which "the people's liberation army has been defeating Chiang Kai-shek" show well the power of synthesis and the didactic clarity of Mao Tse-tung:

- "1.- Attack first isolated and scattered enemies and then attack powerful and concentrated enemies.
- 2.- Take first small and middle-sized towns and villages and the rural country, and then take the large cities.
- 3.- Consider as the primary objective the annihilation of the enemy's fighting force and not the holding or taking of cities and positions.
- 4.- Concentrate absolutely superior forces in any battle -- two, three, four, and sometimes five or six times greater than those of the enemy -- to surround the enemy on all sides and fight for his annihilation without anyone escaping from the net. Avoid wearing battles in which the gains do not compensate the losses or in which the gains merely offset the losses.
- 5.- Do not fight in unplanned battles. Do not fight in battles where there is no certainty of victory. Try to make sure of the planning and the certainty of victory in every battle, on the basis of the relationship existing between our conditions and

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the conditions of the enemy.

- 6.- Develop heroic qualities in the fighter. Do not fear sacrifice, fatigue, and continuous actions -- that is, fight without resting in various successive battles in a short space of time.
- 7.- Try to destroy the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, emphasize the importance of the tactic of attacking positions, taking strong points and bases from the enemy.
- 8.- With regard to the problem of attacks upon cities, seize from the enemy in resolute manner all weakly defended cities and fortified ~~strong~~ points. When opportunities are favorable and when circumstances permit, take from the enemy all fortified points and cities defended in ordinary fashion. Wait until conditions are ripe and then take all the powerfully defended cities and fortified points.
- 9.- Reestablish our troops by capturing all the enemy's arms and the majority of his men. The source of men and materiel of our army is principally at the fighting front.
- 10.- Learn to utilize the intervals between two campaigns for resting, regrouping, and training our troops."

Differences between the war of movement or of positions and guerrilla warfare

thus
We have the necessary elements, ~~therefore~~ for defining the ~~main~~ main differences between guerrilla warfare and regular war. These characteristic differences refer to the number of units engaged in an operation, organization, equipment, relations between commands, combat duties, and relations between front and rear.

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In the first place: In comparison with the regular units, the guerrilla units are numerous, but their ranks include a small number of fighters, going from a few individuals to hundreds and thousands. Numerically, their personnel is much smaller than that of the regular units. In summary, number of units: greater; personnel: smaller.

In the second place: Since the guerrilla war depends principally on small groups or corps organized hurriedly before the approach of the enemy, the organization is in conformity with local needs and is of small scope. Weapons are generally elementary, and supplies are built up from everything that can be obtained in the immediate vicinity. All these things are different in regular armies.

In the third place: The nature of guerrilla tactics is also irregular, fundamentally swift and mobile, generally avoiding decisive clashes. It is ^{neither} like the war of position, whose tactics are based on defense and attack along a fixed front, in open and direct combat, without any suggestion whatever of flexibility; nor is it like war of movement, whose regular tactics consist of reconnoitering, patrolling, advancing, withdrawing, attacking and defending, in open and direct combat with the enemy, always in clear and orderly fashion.

The transformation of a war of movement into a war of position, which is possible in regular warfare, never occurs in guerrilla warfare.

With regard to relations between commands, guerrilla warfare is

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characterized by independent decisions and decentralized commands. What it especially needs is a certain degree of coordination between neighboring combat units, a broad form of strategic cooperation with the activity of the regular units, and cooperation, in combat and in campaign, with a certain number of units placed at the disposition of the guerrilla forces. Strictly coordinated activity is impossible.

As for relations between front and rear, since the guerrilla war has a very mobile front from its base, and because the latter is generally in the enemy's rear and therefore isolated from the main rear of the nation, guerrilla war does not have a rear, in the strict sense of the word. This is not the case with regular armies.

With regard to the war tasks there is also a considerable difference between regular armies and guerrilla forces. The latter work on the annihilation of small enemy units in ~~flank~~ attacks on the flanks of large enemy forces and ⁱⁿ surprise attacks on communication lines. They also engage in the establishment of bases for independent operations in the enemy's rear and on coordinated operations with the regular armies far from the war fronts and areas."

Or in other words:

1 - Regular war has stable bases; in guerrilla war, however, the bases must always be changed, so that the enemy will never know from where he is going to be hit, for once he located these bases he could crush them with superior forces. Experience shows that fixed bases create dangers, absence of activity, political stupor⁶ (the experience of the great maquis of Savoy, France). When a part

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of territory is liberated, the guerrilla organization evolves into the creation of regular units, combining their tactics with those of the new regular army and with armed formations of the populace.

2 - Guerrilla war is based on small, mobile detachments of reduced, easily handled numbers, permitting mobility, camouflage, and infiltration. It is made up of very small groups in the cities and of detachments of 20 to 24 men in the country, the scattered units being able to aid each other. It is the tactic of the ball of mercury which breaks up into little balls and comes back together, which slips through the fingers, is difficult to catch.

3 - The strategy of the guerrillas does not make use of retreats. Their tactics are a continuous combination of ^{alternate} attack and withdrawal. The Chinese retreat from Canton is an exceptional case of a strategic retreat of guerrillas.

4 - Whereas regular war is based on the centralization of plans, orders, and command, guerrilla warfare is characterized by decentralization, i.e. an over-all direction of activity and the maximum ^{autonomy} ~~activity~~ of the units and commands. It is confidence in the initiative, in the creative strength of the masses. This autonomy must lead, with the change in level of the fighting, to military centralization. Unless concentration is attained, the people's war cannot be victorious.

Two more important differences must be included: the moral forces, which the people's war raises to the highest level through political education and the consciousness of the objectives of the struggle on the part of the combatants, and armament, which in people's war

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combines the most advanced instruments of military technique with any and all weapons and with the artifices created through the initiative of the people. The guerrillas arm^{ed} themselves with the weapons ~~xx~~ torn from the enemy. Although the patriots' inferiority in material may be great in the beginning, "there is no reason for overestimating the enemy's armament; this armament must be considered and rated in the light of the personal qualities of those who produce it and those who use it."

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Knowing the characteristics of guerrilla war and of people's war, their principal differences and their points of contact, the question is now one of knowing what the essential and decisive form of the war should be within a national liberation struggle.

We already know that "guerrilla war is an integral part of the strategy of every revolutionary war" and that it "can only constitute a form or a phase of that war if it does not separate itself from the masses." We already know that "guerrilla warfare can occasionally become the principal form of operations in an anti-imperialist war and that it is the principal and even general form of the struggle to the enemy's rear!"

"But, taking war as a whole, regular war ^{is} without a doubt the main, basic form, and its strategic role is the decisive one, while guerrilla warfare is auxiliary to it. The regular army is the main, basic force, and the guerrillas are a secondary force helping the regular force to carry out their war tasks."

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The proper balance, then, is in "~~not assuming~~ neither over-estimating the role of guerrilla warfare (which would be an error of the left) nor underestimating it (which would be an error of the right). The main, basic form of operation in a revolutionary war continues to be the war of movement. It is necessary, however, to develop it energetically. Under certain, defined conditions regular warfare can change ~~into~~ temporarily into guerrilla warfare and vice versa. Both must be developed and coordinated as a whole according to the conditions and tasks of the war."

An example is "the historic fight of the Chinese Red Army (1927-1936) which is full of great deeds of guerrilla warfare. From the beginning, a proper political line was firmly maintained. In a continuous chain of defeats and victories many bases were set up, numerous regular units evolved gradually from the guerrilla forces. guerrilla fighting was widely developed even after the creation of regular units, and multitudes of newly created guerrilla groups on a large scale actively coordinated their operations/with those of the regulars. They achieved victory upon victory. In spite of their poverty in weapons and their numerical inferiority in relation to the enemy forces, the guerrillas were stimulated, both in their own operations and in fighting coordinated with the main army, by the close co-operation of the masses, resulting from good political work.

". . . A large number of valuable lessons were learned from that fight, but the main experience was the ~~linkage~~ connection between firm, strong, and tireless political direction and creative political work. Internal unity was assured, and intimate relations with the people were established. A proper policy was carried out in relation to the forces of the enemy. Both in strategy and in

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tactics, an adequate coordination between guerrillas and regulars was carried out. Agile guerrilla tactics were employed; attention and enthusiasm were given to the creation of politico-military bases; and the evolution of the guerrilla forces into a regular army was actively developed. The result was that we were able to keep up the war for ten years, conquer numerous difficulties, and realize the objective of direct participation in the war against Japan.

" . . . Guerrilla war may be waged not only by small units but also by large regular units, isolated in the enemy's rear by his advance (or for other reasons) and placed temporarily and partially under new conditions and tasks (decentralized activities and commands, different relations between the front and rear). Such was the case with the troops which defended Feng Ling Tu, the case with the Soviet units and corps which were isolated by the German advance in 1941-42. The way out was the change from guerrilla war to a war of movement.

"It is thus seen that guerrilla war can be carried out not only by groups and corps of guerrillas made up of masses which have armed and organized themselves, as required by particular conditions and war tasks, but by regular units temporarily placed under new conditions and new tasks."

In this particular, the mission of the Chinese 8th Army consisted in "waging guerrilla warfare, basically, but in letting no opportunity pass for carrying out war of movement."

In a certain manner,

After a fashion, that represented the materialization of Lenin's thinking on the units of a people's army: "Let no opportunity pass

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for raining blows against the adversary."

Liberated zones and bases

What characterizes a revolutionary war fundamentally is the participation and cooperation of the large masses around a clearly defined political program; it is the creation of a stable base, made up of areas liberated from the adversary's control. "What fundamentally constitutes guerrilla strategy is the liberation of territory, the creation of bases in enemy territory from which his political power may be driven out; it is the enlargement of liberated areas, their transformation into a stable rear for the forces of liberation."

According to Mao Tse-tung, "a long guerrilla war in occupied territory is impossible without the support of bases. Guerrilla war is war without a rear, since it is isolated in the enemy's rear, out off from the rear of the State. But guerrilla war cannot long survive and develop without a base, and that base becomes the guerrillas' rear. The absence of such a base would deprive us of the means for attaining our war objectives and our strategic tasks."

There are various kinds of bases: in mountainous terrain, on plains (where only small, temporary, and very mobile detachments are called for, and only in certain seasons), and in river and lake areas (where it is possible to disrupt enemy river and maritime traffic.).

Guerrilla districts are the initial nucleus, the first ~~stage~~ ^{step toward} in

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the formation of bases. They are characterized by an incomplete occupation of the terrain in the beginning of operations, when only a good place for the concentration of activities has been chosen, with a temporary rear ^{area} With the annihilation of the enemy and the development of mass labor, the district is turned into a stable base..

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Under these conditions, the districts and the bases of the Chinese guerrilla war remind one of the maquis of Europe, with the areas progressively controlled and then liberated by them. Extensiveness of territory and communication difficulties are conditions favorable to the rapid expansion of districts into bases. In the Greece of today, that which corresponds to the Chinese districts are the refuge and support points to which the persecuted patriots retreated when life became unbearable under the terror reigning in the cities. The strategic task of ~~the~~ guerrilla war consists of "extending the liberated and controlled areas as much as possible and reducing to the minimum the territory occupied by the enemy."

There are three conditions for establishing a base:

"First (the main one): have an armed detachment. Without this, the other problems cannot be discussed.

"Second (connected to the first): defeat the enemy in cooperation with the people. Drive him from the villages, settlements, farms, cities, and regions he occupies. If the enemy is not beaten, he can retake tomorrow the regions liberated by the guerrilla force.

"Third: carry the fight of the masses against the occupier or against the ruling classes at his service. ^{Let the masses} Fighting by the

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fight
 masses with all means, including the use of armed detachments. Through these fights, the people must arm themselves and form local guards and reserves for guerrilla detachments. This will make it possible to enlarge the liberated zones, consolidate them, develop their administration with the support of the mass organizations (peasants, women, youth, professionals, etc.). The power of the people cannot be manifested if they are not organized. Administrations established on the basis of participation by the masses must dedicate themselves to a national front policy and to uniting all forces and means against the enemy. It must not be forgotten that the essential task in establishing such a basis is galvanizing and organizing the masses, including training them as armed forces in guerrilla fighting."

The military organization

In China the development of the fighting gave birth to military areas in the enemy's rear. According to their size, they fell into various categories: major area, minor area, sub-area.

The supreme authority for the guerrilla campaign in all areas is in the hands of the military commander and the political commissar. The former has directly under his orders the military staff and its sections *together with* the medical and supply service. The latter is directly in charge of the political department, comprising the propaganda sections, work among enemy troops, organization, civilian transportation, and general affairs.

In order to harmonize military affairs and civil administration, a military area or sub-area may set up a politico-military council

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of seven or eight members chosen by the guerrilla units and the local administrations. The chief of this council must be the highest ranking ~~of the~~ leaders of the military area. The populace of the military area must be armed. The local guards will fulfill an important function as defense forces of the people's property, and of rear area security and as auxiliary combat forces. The same care in the preparation and expansion of reserves is observed in Italy and France as in the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The patriotic militias or people's guards, bringing together especially the great laboring mass, assure even within the zone occupied by the enemy a self-defense of ~~the~~ mass activities and resistance to terror and looting on the part of the enemy. They develop the confidence of the masses in their own strength; they participate progressively in military action. Through them the mobilization of the civilian population is widened for the insurrectional struggle or for the enlargement of the conquered areas. In China as in Europe this mobilization is carried on mainly by volunteers. The volunteers consist primarily of youth.

Personnel are echelanned between a maximum and a minimum for each unit: 7-10 combatants for a combat group, 48-120 for a company comprising 2-4 sections of three groups, 343-448 for a battalion; 1263-1589 for a regiment of three battalions.

There are some appreciable differences between the military organization of units and ^{of} the guerrilla command ^{both} in China and in Europe. Let us look at some of them, beginning with the commands. In China, the command of a military zone or area as well as of the units is divided between the military commander of the area

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and the political commissar. Their immediate assistants are the chief of the General Staff, with its ~~military~~ subordinate sections and services, and the chief of the Political Department with its specific sections, viz. propaganda, counter-espionage, disintegration of enemy troops, intelligence, health, political work in general. It should be pointed out that

- 1) - Certain services, such as Intelligence and Health, are under the political commissar through the political department;
- 2) - the other sections of the staff of ^a regular unit are directly under the Military Chief through his chief of staff.

This basis of organization, as near as possible to the organization of the regular military units, should particularly facilitate the transformation of the guerrilla units into regular units, an important factor in the development of the fighting and in the training of reserves for the regular National Army. It is the expression of a higher phase of the national struggle against the invader after more than ten years of armed resistance through ~~the~~ guerrilla warfare and the incorporation of this warfare into the general anti-Japanese strategy. Guerrilla war has points of support, liberated zones, and bases or districts in the enemy's rear area. It does not refer to the fighting inside cities.

In France the military organization grew out of more elementary forms, care being taken from the beginning to include the elements essential to its later transformation into a regular military organization. The chain of command ^{went} ~~goes~~ down from the center (national committee) to the states or regions (regional committees) and to the

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towns, or directly to the organized units. The organization adapted
itself to the necessities of security created by the illegality
of its activity.

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The commands are set up on a threefold basis: A political officer is responsible for political work among the troops, for personnel, for liaison with the civilian organizations of the Resistance (National Liberation Committees, the National Front, political and trade union organizations); it is through these organizations that the military organization receives volunteers for combat. A military officer is in direct command of the maquis and other units and of military operations; he will discuss with the political officer any promotion, appointment, or modification in the officer corps. And a technical officer is responsible for the tasks executed by various teams, corresponding to the various sections and services of a staff, such as: materiel (weapons, manufacture of grenades, caltrops, explosive and incendiary devices, obtaining explosives, making mines, printing propaganda material, etc.), supply (particularly important for the maquis outside cities), health, intelligence, documentation and other items essential to illegal activity, particularly in the cities.. Each officer has an adjutant to replace him in case of accidents, prison, or death. Fighting starts in the cities through squads of four combatants and combat groups of two squads, i.e. eight men. These units are made up of individual volunteers from the political groups, sabotage groups in factories and mines, self-defense groups or special teams in enterprises, and later, beginning in 1944, of patriotic militia (or people's guards in Italy), an enlargement of the first self-defense teams, a ready reserve for the guerrilla units.

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As the fighting grows and personnel increase, the different sections of the Technical Service take on the form of a real headquarters staff. Organization of unit personnel generally falls into a threefold pattern: Three groups form a detachment, 24 men plus the command; three detachments form a company, 72 men plus the command and auxiliary services. The numbers of the maquis (which must be as agile and as flexible as a ball of mercury) must not exceed 25 men.

A similar organization is observed among the "partigiani" in Italy: combat groups of 5 to 10 fighters; detachments; brigades. The maximum strength for each concentration in the forests or mountains is 40 men. In the large cities, the People's Armed Guards had definite military objectives, both before and during the national insurrection. They combined and carried out their missions with the revolutionary and grievance activity of the civilian mass.

As a general rule, the Chinese guerrilla war was based fundamentally on the rural country. "One of the weakest links of our activities at present is the workers' movement in the cities," states the letter of testament of Fan Chyi-min in 1935. The principle of the Chinese People's Army with regard to big cities is to "surround them, occupy outer positions, wait for conditions to ripen."

In France and Italy, the guerrilla campaign started in the cities. Not until 1942 ~~could~~ ^{begin to win} did it ~~gain~~ in the interior of France through resistance to deportation, to forced labor in Germany, to military preparation camps for youth, and to the repression and terror instigated by Vichy. But it was still the inhabitants of the cities,

especially the workers and the working and student youth, who organized the first concentration and self-defense nuclei, which later were to take the name maquis. At the same time that ^(the fighting) ~~it~~ was growing and ~~gaining~~ expanding in the large cities and in the large mining concentrations, ^{it} ~~the fighting~~ was extending to the countryside, where the maquis were supported and reinforced by the enlisting of the young peasants who had escaped deportation and forced labor. In the defense of French property, in the fight against forced requisitions, a democratic union of city and country was forged, an alliance between the working class and other urban patriots and the peasantry. The peasants supplied the maquis, furnished them with intelligence, and supported their fight. The fighters obstructed the requisitionings and in the liberated areas satisfied the immediate grievances of the rural populace.

This coordination of the struggle in the city and in the country is even today a concern of the chiefs of the people's war, both in Greece and in Spain. General Modesto, one of the great generals of the Spanish People's Army from 1936 to 1939, writes of the current struggle in his land, "The guerrilla movement, which already has strong roots in the countryside, must ^{be linked} ~~link itself~~ more closely to the working class." It is indispensable "to tie the struggle of the workers ~~more~~ and ~~more~~ of the guerrillas more and more together, that is, to unify activity in the city and in the country so that each combat of the working class might be responded by actions and combats ^(on the part of) ~~by~~ the guerrillas and that the guerrilla fighting in the country might be supported with fighting by the workers in the cities. Synchronizing the activities of the city workers and of the peasants ^{as} ~~is~~ obliging the enemy to disperse forces, ^{and helps} ~~it is increasing~~

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the people's struggle."

The same experience occurred in Greece; "The only effective resistance -- that of the EAM (national front) and of the ELAS -- whole brought the nation together little by little. The fighting in the countryside and mountains was coordinated with the fighting in the cities, the military ^{fight} struggle and the political ^{fight} struggle."

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These are the general lines of the development and military doctrine of a people's army. It is clear that in order to fight in such condition, the ^{prerequisite} ~~fundamental~~ is an intense, persevering, and untiring ^{work} ~~effort~~ in organization. In addition to a knowledge of the economic and social realities of his country and region, ~~to~~ a liaison with the struggles of the people, and ~~to~~ a clear vision of the objectives to be attained and of the prospects opening up before the nation, it behooves each fighter to study and work to master military art completely, not just the military art of the ruling regime but above all that of the proletariat. Without a thorough knowledge of "modern military technique and the precepts of contemporary tactics and strategy" and without "learning to master all forms of fighting", assimilating the experiences and initiatives pertinent to ^{people's} popular struggles, the patriots will not ~~be~~ measure up to their responsibilities and duties toward the nation. This duty is even more imperative for the ~~army~~ officers whose responsibilities increase with the growth of the means at the enemy's disposal, for the war against imperialism requires a qualified command, theoretical knowledge and practical experience in military science. As the regulations of the People's Armies point out, "the fighter and the chief

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are not measuring up to their position today if they are not constantly bettering themselves, ~~without~~ never stopping with the knowledge they have acquired." And that principle takes on a vigor a hundred times greater for the Brazilian patriots of today, ^{in view of} ~~before~~ the imminent danger of a new imperialist war, ~~before~~ the increasing colonization of our Country and the rapid development of the patriotic struggles of our people, in all forms, in city and country.

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